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ARTICLES
LES MISERABLES REDUX: LAW
AND THE POOR
ALLAN

C.

HUTCHINSON*

Certainly they appeared utterly depraved, corrupt, vile and odious; but
it is rare for those who have sunk so low not to be degraded in the
process, and there comes a point, moreover, where the unfortunate and
the infamous are grouped together, merged in a single and fateful
word. They are les misirables-theoutcasts, the underdogs. And who
is to blame?
Victor Hugo'
Each day a poignant and pathetic ritual is performed outside courthouses. Osgoode Hall in downtown Toronto is no exception. Like most
courthouses and seats of the profession's ruling body, it is at the center of
the city's legal life. Built in 1832, it is an impressive building that affects
the imposing stylistic tradition of classical architecture. With its monumental stone balustrade and fluted Ionic columns, the facade's grandeur
is intended to exalt the law and awe the citizen; it is a modest monument
to law's assumed majesty and prestige.2 Yet, in almost time-honored tradition, a street person or two stands outside the ornamental wrought-iron
railings that encircle it. Most lawyers walk past them, but some stop to
place a coin in their outstretched hands. This sad scene has been commonplace throughout the century and across the continent.
Just as depressing and troubling is the fact that what goes on outside
the court is only a more obvious and less refined enactment of what goes
on inside the courts. That pitiful pageant and personal exchange symbolizes the relation between the law and the poor. It is a daily confirmation
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. Many thanks to Pam Carpenter,
Blair Holder and Rose Della Rocca for comments and support.
1. VICTOR HUGO, LEs MISfRABLES 639-40 (Norman Denny trans., 1976) (1862).
2. See Kimberly R. Jones, House of Justice: Feminism in Architecture, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 281 (1991) (a provocative account of legal buildings).
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of the law's cruel indifference to the plight of society's les misdrables. For
all its fine rhetoric and noble posing, the law and its guardians have little
time for the street people. Shepherded from its swept steps and
manicured lawns, they must hover at its perimeters and hope for the
occasional gesture of personal charity. Figuratively and literally, law
remains aloof and out of bounds for them. The law is exactly as it is
represented in its architectural embodiment: an intimidating bastion of
power and privilege that houses the establishment's judicial representatives who contrive to turn a blind eye to the underclass.
The poor and the disenfranchised might be occasionally invited into
its great halls, but their visits are temporary and tenuous. They remain
only as long as they adopt a polite and ingratiating posture of supplication, make an appropriate display of gratitude and affect a suitable attitude of contrition about their condition. As for the street people, they
hold few illusions about the law's willingness to do anything that will
truly address and alleviate their situation. It is still for the law to give
and the poor to receive. They are not allowed to take what is theirs; they
continue to be dependent upon the law's occasional gesture of idiosyncratic generosity. Such a relationship impoverishes the law as much as it
demeans the poor. Through its condescending acts of benevolence, the
law manages to affirm its own power and authority at the same time that
it reinforces the powerlessness of the poor.
In this essay, I want to validate this rather harsh and stark depiction
of the law's institutional callousness and to condemn its pathological
incompetence in responding to the needs of the most deprived and desolate in the community. In order to throw a more illuminating and less
bombastic light upon the matter, I will enlist the help of Victor Hugo's
Les Misdrables.3 Although written 150 years ago, it retains an appalling
similarity to contemporary conditions and challenges. By focusing on
that work's themes and imagery, I hope to demonstrate the structural
failings of courts as a forum for social transformation and to chastise
academics for their complicity in the misguided efforts to litigate an end
to poverty and its pernicious effects. In particular, I want to revisit the
rights debate and, in light of recent interventions, explore the role that
rights litigation might play in a revised vision and practice of egalitarian
politics. While rights talk is not always inimical to social transformation,
I contend that it is always limited and limiting. At best, I can tolerate,
but have little faith in, the possibility of progressive intervention through
rights litigation.
3. Supra note 1.
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I.

HUGO'S HARANGUE

For better and worse, Victor Hugo (1802-85) is a titan of Western
literature. Like most great writers, he transformed the conventional
standards of artistic merit as he exceeded them. A prodigious writer of
poetry, drama and prose, his work manages to traverse the spectrum of
literary styles and sensibilities. Possessing technical skills and mythic
imagination in uncommon abundance, he both procreated and perfected
a novelistic genre that combined soaring romanticism with earthy realism on the grandest scale. With his consummate command of language,
Hugo wrote novels that reflected his intellectual and emotional bravura.
The masterpiece of his extensive oeuvre is Les Misdrables. Along with
Notre Dame de Paris, this work represents the high-water mark of his
literary genius. It is, at once, a sociological essay, adventure thriller, sermon, historical chronicle, educational text, gothic romance, political
pamphlet, philosophical meditation and much more.
Yet, never only a brilliant virtuoso, Hugo placed his huge literary
talents in the service of popular suffrage: "Peer through the heart of the
people and you will discover the truth."' A precocious talent of middleclass parentage, he quickly abandoned his family's Bonapartism and
traditional defense of conservative values. Over the years and in spurts
and starts, he became an outspoken critic for a republican form of government. He was an active participant in political life and, after the
revolution of 1848, sought to rally workers against state oppression. 6
This led to his long, but productive exile from France in the Channel
Islands. By the time Les Misdrables was published in 1862, Hugo had
become a committed democrat and socialist. He was an avowed
defender of "the absolute principle of democracy" 7 under which any
attempt to deprive people, as individuals or as a community, of power
amounted to usurpation. Allied to this was an enthusiastic espousal of
"the message of socialism" 8 with its emphasis on free education, health
care and the democratization of private property in "the union of material and moral greatness." 9 Political struggle and social enlightenment
were the touchstones of his own literary expectations. He understood
4. See FOSTER E. GUYER, THE TITAN VICTOR HUGO (1955); VICTOR HUGO (Harold Bloom
ed., 1988).
5. HUGO, supra note 1, at 509.
6.

See ELLIOTT M. GRANT, THE CAREER OF VICTOR HUGO (1945); ANDRt MAUROIS,

OLYMPIO: THE LIFE OF VICTOR HUGO (Gerard Hopkins trans., 1956).
7. See HUGO, supra note 1, at 718.
8. See id. at 724.
9. Id.
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that salvation is not given from above, through God or Law, but is taken
from below by the people themselves.10
The general storyline and structure of Les Misdrablesis well known
and needs little rehearsal. By combining cosmic themes with domestic
details, Les Misdrables manages to be both a social testimony to human
suffering and an epic tale of human deliverance. Possessing a seemingly
inextinguishable belief in the spiritual possibilities of people, Hugo
presents a melodrama of human perfectibility in which, through will and
circumstance, the corrupted become cleansed: "Is there not in every
human soul.., an essential spark, an element of the divine,... which
goodness can preserve, nourish, and fan into glorious flame, and which
evil can never quite extinguish?" 1 1 His ultimate ambition was not the
individual salvation of a human soul, but the collective resurrection of
humankind. Encompassing the vast canvass of French history in the first
forty years of the last century, the narrative thread is the extraordinary
life and travails of Jean Valjean as convict, industrialist, fugitive, protector, philanthropist and protagonist. Through him, Hugo introduces a
sprawling cast of memorable characters and romantic stereotypes-the
tragic Fantine, the malevolent Th6nardier, the angelic Cosette, the lovelorn Marius, the uncompromising Enjolras, the impish Gavroche and, of
course, the remorseless Javert. But, throughout the book, the dramatis
personae seem only convenient constructs through which the epic stuff of
life and death is animated and acted out. More than being an extravagant tableaux of a larger-than-life Paris, it is a sweeping saga of the struggle between good and evil, light and dark, and sublime and grotesque.
Les Misdrables is often too stylized, didactic, indulgent and dithyrambic; Hugo's proselytizing tendencies occasionally eclipse his poetic
gifts and his sociological ascriptions sometimes overwhelm his redemptive aspirations. But, even flawed as all romantic novels are, it bears
heroic witness to the social consciousness and conditions of the time.
More than that, Les Misdrables can still speak to us across history. Its
themes remain as relevant today as they were shocking in yesteryear;
they resonate troublingly with the social conditions of fin-de-sidcle
America. In the last 150 years, much has changed, but much has stayed
the same. The plight of the downtrodden and disenfranchised is a
10. This assessment is by no means universal. Some contend that Les Misdrables is basically a
political book whose commitment to revolutionary change is more apparent than real, and which
hides a deep attachment to order and continuity. See VICTOR BROMBERT, VICTOR HUGO AND THE
VISIONARY NOVEL 135-39 (1984).
11.

HUGO,supra note 1, at 98.
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powerful and permanent feature of contemporary life in North America.
Moreover, law continues to be long on words and short on action.
In this essay, I intend to draw upon only a few of the threads that
comprise the thematic tapestry of Les Misirables. Of course, the book
amounts to much more and much less than these particular and selective
motifs.12 I intend to pursue three related angles that provide a neat organizational structure for the essay: the condition of poverty and its apprehension by the privileged; the self-serving ethics and false esteem of the
philanthropic citizen; and the crass antagonism of law and its officers to a
truly transformative vision and practice of egalitarian justice. Together,
these themes combine to form a strong indictment against law and its
role in les misdrables' continued suffering.
The first theme is that of poverty. Like Dickens and Orwell, 13 Hugo
captures the suffering and degradation of abject poverty and destitution
in all its graphic and nauseating detail. For him, misery is a social condition and not an individual state of mind; its eradication requires action to
change the material and structural circumstances of life rather than
moral suasion and discipline urged upon individual minds. Yet, generally resisting the temptation to romanticize those "[a]t the level of utmost
poverty [whose] wits are too dulled to complain at misfortune or give
thanks for a benefaction," 14 Hugo never robs them of their dignity or
pride. He places blame for the continuing conditions of miserable poverty squarely on the padded shoulders of those who thrive. Lambasting
the privileged's pitiful demonization or patronization of unprivileged
communities as a breeding ground for crime and unrest, the real enemy is
not outsiders, but "[i]t is ourselves we have to fear[; p]rejudice is the real
robber, and vice the real murderer."15 Even the most enlightened legal
actors treat les misdrables as a race apart. Different from themselves,
they must be tolerated, but they need not be embraced. The judgments
of the courts in Young v. New York City Transit Authority -- and their
framing of the issues before them-rather than the decisions themselves,
12. It seems worthwhile emphasizing that I do not offer my interpretation ofLes Misdrablesas
the correct, true, best, only or whatever reading. See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE
THRESHOLD (1988). It is simply one attempt to put my reading to topical effect. For other interpretations, see, e.g., RICHARD B. GRANT, THE PERILOUS QUEST 154-76 (1968); Bloom, supra note 4.
13. See CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD (1863); GEORGE ORWELL, DOWN AND
OUT IN PARIS AND LONDON (1933).

14. HUGO, supra note 1, at 817.
15. Id. at 42.
16. 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).

204 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISCIPLINAR Y LAW JOURNAL
rely on the supercilious and condescending image of beggars that informs
and grounds the law.
The second theme is derivative of the first. Whereas the first speaks
to the general relation between the haves and have-nots, the second
explores its expression in the individual dealings of the pauper and the
philanthropist. Although "[i]gnominy thirsts for respect,"" 7 those who
offer charity to the poor do so as much in the spirit of self-righteousness
as from a sense of solidarity. Philanthropists are too often motivated by
a need to assuage their own guilt than by a wish to eradicate poverty. In
a provocative contribution to the legal debate over rights and begging,
Helen Hershkoff and Adam Cohen run this risk of philanthropic
patronization."8 They seek to speak for beggars and to alleviate their
condition by arguing that begging is fully protected speech under the
First Amendment.1 9 However, laudable intentions do not excuse lamentable effects. Their proposal to establish a right to beg is more likely than
not to inhibit rather than enhance the long-term prospects of les misdrables for personal and collective salvation.
The third theme is more overtly jurisprudential in focus and design.
For Hugo the law is very much part of les misdrables' problems rather
than a resource in their resolution. The law is a conservative and cold
force that not only holds in place the social conditions of poverty, but
also works its own oppression when les misdrables fall under its influence.
The epic encounters between Jean Valjean and Inspector Javert represent
the clash between the popular pressures for social change and the established forces of authoritarian order. Notwithstanding the dismal history
of efforts to effect social change through the courts, contemporary activists are unable to resist the allure of rights-talk and still tend to look to
the courts as the preferred forum of transformative choice. This is a fundamental error and a tactical mistake. If there is to be real change for
the progressive good, it will not come through the courts. Indeed, only
lawyers seem to imagine that it could or will.
II.

CHEAP TALK

Like Victor Hugo's Paris of the last century, the contemporary
streets of American cities are home to legions of the wretched and
17. HUGO, supra note 1, at 86.
18. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S.Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991).
19. See infra part III.A.
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dispossessed. Without support or shelter, these beggars are found everywhere, but "become lost in that cold murk that envelops solitary destinies, the distressful shadows wherein disappear so many unfortunates in
the sombre progress of mankind."' 20 Insult is added to injury by the fact
that, although the United States is the richest country in the world, it has
the greatest disparity between the income and wealth of the rich and
poor; the top ten percent of households control about seventy percent of
the wealth and the bottom ten percent live below the poverty line.2 1 In a
country of plenty, homelessness is a condition that afflicts over 500,000
people 22 and amounts to a national disgrace. The enormity of the problem reduces the pain-searing cry of personal tragedy to the sedated murmur of a collective statistic.

A. POOR

RELATIONS

While the suffering of today's les misdrables is everywhere and
always present, society has developed various discursive devices by which
to comprehend and contain them. Indeed, like all languages, the rhetoric
of poverty creates and classifies reality at the same time that it responds
to and is limited by that reality: "how we talk and argue about poverty
reveals what we believe about ourselves and others. ' 23 It is through the
act of categorization and labelling that a particular reality is apprehended and maintained. Reality's identity and meaning is never simply
found or observed, but is always imposed and located within a particular
ideological structure of discourse; it is less a matter of technical refinement and more a case of creative designation. Mindful that no mode of
discourse passively represents instead of actively producing, the world
must be spoken for, and often manages to communicate in the accent of
established interests. As such, the rhetoric of poverty has its own history
and politics because the privilege of naming is part and parcel of the
power to control.24
20.

HUGO, supra note 1, at 94.

21. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 8-9 (1990). The situation is proportionately worse for the young, women and people of color. Id. at 202-09; see also WILLIAM J.
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).

22. MARTHA R. BURT & BARBARA E. COHEN, AMERICA'S HOMELESS: NUMBERS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND PROGRAMS THAT SERVE THEM 32 (1989).
23. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J.
1499, 1502 (1991).
24. For a more general description of the discursive element of politics, see David Cohen &
Allan C. Hutchinson, Of Persons and Property:The Politicsof Legal Taxonomy, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J.
20 (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990).
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Vast intellectual and ideological resources are expended in establishing and maintaining the rhetoric of poverty. The rhetoric of poverty
attempts to provide an account of poverty that is able both to recognize
the plight and pain of the poor and to confirm the lack of responsibility
by the privileged for that condition of inequality. A way of speaking is
sought that allows people to identify the suffering of the poor without
having to identify with the poor. As such, it is obviously the voice of the
non-poor that speaks from the vantage point of its own privilege. The
poor are denied access to both material and intellectual resources.
Shunned and silenced, they suffer the double indignity of being consigned
to existential penury and intellectual purgatory. Deprived of a language
through which to speak, their experience is diminished and distanced
from the reality that the rhetoric of poverty claims to represent.
The chief rhetorical maneuver in the discourse of poverty is the stigmatization of the poor as lazy, unmotivated, weak-willed, profligate and
dull. They are a thoroughly undisciplined group whose poverty "in the
land of opportunity... has seemed not only a misfortune but a moral
failure."2 5 In short, with a bad attitude and even shoddier work habits,
the poor are responsible for their own misfortune and, therefore, its
future amelioration; life is not a handout. It is a discourse of difference in
which the poor are treated as a race apart. While they are considered to
share a common humanity with the rest of society, they are marked by
their poverty as less deserving of common solicitude. Because they do
not play a full part in the production of society's wealth, they are in no
position to demand or expect a full share in its distribution. In the lexicon of strict liberalism, individuals must assume full responsibility for
their own lives because it is the individual, and not the society of which
they are part, that determines their role and its possibilities.
The effect of this discursive dissemblance is two-fold. First, it
presents the causes of poverty as individual and personal rather than collective and public. Being based on a lack of moral fiber and substance,
attention is focused upon the state of particular person's moral constitution and not upon the social and economic structure into which people
are born and live. Poverty is not a function of present arrangement, but
is a malfunctioning of certain sectors of the population. As such, solutions are sought through programs of moral regeneration and civic restoration in which the protestant virtues of discipline, monogamy, sobriety,
25. MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR HOUSE (1986); see also MICHAEL KATZ,
THE UNDESERVING POOR (1989). For a topical account of "why the poor are still with us," see Joel
Schwartz, The Moral Environment of The Poor, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1991, at 21.
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thrift and hard work are inculcated. Initiatives intended to alter the
redistribution of economic resources are placed lower on the social
agenda. For example, prostitutes are more castigated for their failure of
moral chasteness than they are sympathized with for their lack of other
26
means of economic survival.
Secondly, and as an obvious corollary of the first effect, this vocabulary of stigmatization enables the privileged to affect an exasperated posture of helplessness. They engage in much wringing of hands and
creasing of brows. Yet, this way of thinking about poverty excuses the
privileged from accepting or eradicating the more structural cause of
poverty. It justifies the privileged's apparent helplessness in the face of
the poor's own intractability in improving their moral outlook. As with
most forms of hypocrisy, it relieves the privileged from the painful duty
of accepting responsibility and beginning to do something to change matters. It reassures them in their own privilege and confirms their earned
entitlement to a life without hunger. Like most forms of justification, the
rhetoric of poverty is generated for the privileged's own consumption, for
it allows them to continue in their own lives without too much interruption or angst. Living a life of poverty, les misdrables have little need for
such instruction or insight.
Hugo fully understood this discourse of poverty and difference.
While he himself never experienced the severe deprivations of utmost
poverty, his account in Les Misirables is convincing and moving. He
grasps not only the poor's suffering, but the privileged's sanctimony. His
literature provides a stark challenge to the transparency of the elite's selfserving apologetics. However, Hugo does not always resist the temptation to judge the poor and offer the opinion that there is "in its most
noisome and ferocious aspects, a form of social ugliness that was perhaps
even more repulsive than the evil rich: namely, the evil poor."2 7 However, he rejected entirely the view that les misdrables were the architects
of their own moral degeneration and material poverty: "[t]he very words
accepted as terms of abuse-down-and-outs, riff-raff, mobocracy-point,
alas, rather to the faults of those who rule than to the sins of those who
suffer, to the misdeeds of privilege rather than to those of the disinherited."2 8 In this, Hugo ensures that his writings are not fodder for the
privileged's propaganda, but instead, oblige the privileged to confront, at
26. See Jody Freeman, The Feminist Debate Over Prostitution Reforms: Prostitutes' Rights
Groups, Radical Feminists and the (Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1990).
27. See HUGO, supra note 1, at 739.
28. Id. at 987.
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least, their own rhetorical complicity in the continuing dominion of contemporary social conditions.
The modem tendency to abstract the poor, to portray them as essentially different and, thereby, to distance the poor from privileged purview
and responsibility are forcefully captured in Hugo's famous characterization of the hapless Marius, a confused and idealistic law student who
bears a strong resemblance to the young Hugo. Marius falls madly in
love with Cosette. But, when she moves away without trace, he is soon
thrown into despair. Already enduring a severely frugal and ascetic life,
he falls into the abyss of penurious hardship. After five years of living in
this tortured state, he becomes curious about the family in the neighboring garret who seem to live in greater squalor than his own. He has a
chance encounter with the young daughter-"an ill-treated girl with the
eyes of a grown woman; a blend of fifty and fifteen; one of those creatures, at once weak and repellent, who cause those who set eyes on them
to shudder when they do not weep." 29 Confronted by a life of most utter
destitution and loveless grief, Marius recognizes that he has not until
then encountered the true meaning and hopelessness of real poverty. In
a stem lecture, Hugo delivers a strong rebuke:
People reduced to the last extremity of need are also driven to the
utmost limit of their resources, and woe to any defenseless person who
comes their way. Work and wages, food and warmth, courage and
goodwill-all this is lost to them. The daylight dwindles into shadow
and darkness enters their hearts; and within this darkness man seizes
upon the weakness of woman and child and forces them into ignominy.
No horror is then excluded. Desperation is bounded only by the flimsiest of walls, all giving access to vice and crime.
Health and youth, honor and the sacred, savage delicacy of stillyoung flesh, truth of heart, virginity, modesty, those protective garments of the soul, all are put to the vilest of uses in the blind struggle
for survival that must encounter, and submit to, every outrage.
Fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, brothers, men and women alike
merge into a composite, like a mineral alloy, in the murky promiscuity
of sexes, relationships, ages, infamy and innocence. They huddle
together, back to back, in a kind of spiritual hovel, exchanging glances
of lamentable complicity. How pale they are, those unfortunates, how
cold they are! They might be the inhabitants of a planet far more
distant from the sun than our own.
29. Id. at 633.
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To Marius the girl was in some sort an emissary of that underworld, disclosing a hideous aspect of its darkness. He was near to
reproaching himself for his habit of abstraction and for the love-affair
which until then had prevented him from giving a thought to his
neighbors. The payment of their rent had been an automatic response,
an impulse that might have occurred to anyone; he, Marius, should
have done better. Only a thin partition separated him from that small
cluster of lost souls groping in darkness and sundered from the living
world; he had heard them living, or rather suffering, within a few yards
of him-and he had paid no attention. All day and every day he had
been conscious of their movements through the wall as they came and
went and talked together, and he had not listened. Groans had been
mingled with the words they spoke, but he had not heeded them. His
thoughts had been elsewhere, squandered in dreams, infatuation, while
these, his fellow-creatures and brothers in Christ, were slowly rotting
beside him, abandoned to their agony. Indeed, it seemed to him that
he was a part of their misfortune and had aggravated it. If they had
had a different neighbor, one less self-absorbed and more concerned for
others, a man of normal, charitable instincts, their desperate state
would not have gone unnoticed, their distress-signals would have been
heard, and perhaps they would have been rescued by now. Certainly
they appeared utterly depraved, corrupt, vile and odious; but it is rare
for those who have sunk so low not to be degraded in the process, and
there comes a point, moreover, where the unfortunate and the infamous are grouped together, merged in a single, fateful word. They are
les misdrables-the outcasts, the underdogs. And who is to blame? Is
it not the most fallen who have most need of charity?30
In this moment of Marius' revelation, Hugo pierces the rhetorical
veil that hides the privileged and self-absorbed from seeing the suffering
that surrounds them and that their own privilege sustains: they look, but
they do not see. In love with themselves, they are effectively blinded to
their own culpability in the pain and torment of their fellow citizens.
This indifference is not only the measure of the callous or the malevolent;
the callous or the malevolent at least have the virtue of honesty. As with
Marius, even the most sensitive and informed can remain truly unconscious of the brute conditions that constitute poverty. Their own relative
privilege only serves to place the complete lack of privilege in even
starker relief. Indeed, the judges in Young are such an example.
30. Id. at 638-40.
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B.

FOREVER YOUNG

William B. Young, Jr. and Joseph Walley were homeless.3 1 They
spent their day soliciting money for themselves in the relative warmth
and shelter of the New York City transit system; they used the money to
buy food, medicines and other essentials.3 2 Because they slept in shelters
at night, they received reduced public assistance of $21.50 every two
weeks.3 3 They approached transit users, asking them for money and

answering any questions that they might have.3 4 In 1989, Young and
Walley were frequently escorted from the premises by the police in consequence of "Operation Enforcement," and threatened with criminal
prosecution.3 5 After a passenger survey, the Transit Authority had
decided to implement more effectively the long-standing prohibition on
begging and panhandling in the subway. 36 At the same time, the Transit
Authority had amended its regulations to permit, in limited circum37
stances, charitable solicitation on its premises.
Through the Legal Action Center for the Homeless, Young and
Walley claimed that their constitutional rights had been infringed and
that the ban on begging was a pretext for evicting the homeless and destitute from the subway system.38 The doctrinal core of the legal issues was
whether the prohibition of begging in a public utility violated the First
Amendment. In particular, it had to be determined whether begging was
protected speech or restrainable conduct and whether the subway system
was a public forum for the purpose of first amendment analysis. At first
instance, District Judge Leonard B. Sand decided that begging was protected speech 39 and that the New York City Transit System was a designated public forum.' Accordingly, the regulations were held to violate
Young and Walley's right to free speech.4 However, on appeal the Second Circuit reversed that decision, with Judge Meskill dissenting in part.
The court held that the regulations were not in contravention of the First
31. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd
in part and vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
32. See Young, 903 F.2d at 166 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

33. Id.
34. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 345.
35. Id.
36. See Young, 903 F.2d at 148-49.

37. See id. at 148.
38. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 349.
39. See id. at 356.
40. See id. at 358.
41. See id. at 360.
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Amendment:
begging was not expressive conduct,4 2 and,
notwithstanding that charitable solicitation was permitted, the subway
was not a designated public forum.4 3
The holdings of the two courts traversed traditional doctrinal territory. The different approaches to and resolution of these perennially
problematic issues of identifying protected speech and designating public
fora are interesting and revealing in themselves.' But, for my objectives,
the more significant and fascinating dimension of the holdings and the
counsels' arguments is their location within an identifiable and contestable mode of rhetorical discourse about poverty. By making implicit
recourse to a particular moral medium and universe, the judges assumed
a shared understanding and representation of poverty and its social intelligibility. In doing so, they perpetuated a world-view whose intellectual
lineage and historical pedigree can be traced back to Hugo and before.
Inadvertently, they bear eloquent witness to the debilitating effects of
that rhetoric and give a judicial imprimatur to its legitimacy. Inherent in
their holdings is the assumption that the poor are different and undeserving, intimidating, unruly, and at the root of much of the chaos and crime
that threatens the hard-working community. While the plight of the
poor is to be regretted, their suffering is not for the rest of society to
endure or be responsible for.
The whole issue in Young initially was framed and presented by the
Transit Authority's lawyers in stark oppositional terms that distinguish
between the poor and homeless, and the hard-working denizens of New
York. For the Transit Authority, the regulations were motivated by concerns for public safety and not the content of the beggars' message.
Drawing upon a lengthy study commissioned in 1988, the Transit
Authority contended that its decision to amend and enforce more
actively existing regulations was a response to the social fact that the
public experiences beggars as an intimidating and discomforting source
of harassment.4 5 The already congested and crowded environment of the
subway was exacerbated by the presence of beggars and the passengers'
high levels of fear and anxiety were heightened.4 6 A consulting sociologist concluded that, whereas ordinary city streets allow "fate-control"
42. See Young, 903 F.2d at 153-54.
43. See id. at 161.
44. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Talking The Good Life: From Free Speech to Democratic Dialogue, 1 YALE J.L. & LIB. 17 (1989).
45. See Young, 903 F.2d at 149-50.
46. See id. at 149. In describing the subway, the court draws upon a Dantean imagery and
evokes Hugo's account of Paris' underground system of sewers:

212 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISCIPLINARY LAW JOURNAL
(i.e., the ability to avoid and move away from an intimidating person),
the constrictive subway system ensures that begging is inherently aggressive, disruptive, startling and potentially dangerous. 7 Indeed, "this
'subset of the homeless' should not be encouraged to beg and panhandle
in the system 'for their own well-being.' ",48 This is cruelly ironic in that
they are only there in the first place to attempt to stave off hunger and to
preserve the lowest form of well-being.
In his opinion for the Court of Appeals on behalf of Judge William
Timbers and himself, Judge Frank Altimari slipped easily into the rhetoric of poverty and gave express approval to the defendant's characterization of the problem and its personnel. He made it clear that
it is not the role of this court to resolve all the problems of the homeless, as sympathetic as we may be. We must fulfill the more modest
task of determining whether the [Transit Authority] may properly ban
49
conduct that it finds to be inherently harmful in the subway system.
For him, much of this resolution could be accomplished by resort to
common sense: "[W]hat common sense beckons the law ordains." 50 Part
of this common sense was an understanding and acceptance that les misirables are "threatening, harassing and intimidating,""1 that "begging in
the subway often amounts to nothing less than assault, creating in the
passengers the apprehension of imminent danger,"" and that it
"amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good." 3
By drawing upon the demonizing rhetoric of poverty, Judge
Altimari is able to instill his judgment with a semblance of reason and
rationality: "Unlike burning a flag, wearing a black arm-band, sitting or
marching, begging in the subway is experienced as transgressive conduct
whether devoid or inclusive of an intent to convey a particularized
message." 54 Yet, his decision that begging is not sufficiently expressive to
be protected speech flies in the face of "right reason ... and common
The New York City subway system transports approximately 3,500,000 passengers on an
average workday, operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and consists of 648 miles of
track, 468 subway stations and over 6,000 subway cars. Many parts of the subway system
are almost 100 years old. In a routine of New York City life, each day a multitude
descends the steep and long staircases and mechanical escalators to wait on narrow and
crowded platforms bounded by dark tunnels and high-powered electrical rails.
Id.; see also HUGO, supra note 1, at 1061-75.

47. See Young, 903 F.2d at 150.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

156-57.
153.
154.
158.
156.
154.
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sense.""5 While its raison d'etre lies in the potential transfer of money,
begging is surely the most basic and compelling kind of communication.
The silent outstretched hand or the rattle of a cup comes closest to
expressing most profoundly and poignantly the ineffable quality of destitution. Those dumb gestures articulate more fully the pathetic poetry of
poverty that Keats's poems, Donne's sermons, and Hugo's prose only
56
stutter and stammer to convey.
For those unconvinced by his invocation of the law's common sense,
Altimari argues that, even if "begging and panhandling possess some
degree of a communicative nature," 57 regulation is permissible if there is
a sufficiently important and substantial government interest at stake.58
In a subtle and passing reference to Renton v. Playtime Theatres,59 he
suggests that beggars and the purveyors of pornographic films are similar
social characters and that their communicative activities are similarly
devoid of redeeming social value. Having unfairly lumped together the
destitute and the depraved, the judge moves to a resounding resolution of
the legal problem that comes from and empirically confirms the disabling
discourse of difference:
The governmental interests in the prohibition of begging in the subway
are more fully elucidated when the harms to be avoided are juxtaposed
with the good to be sustained. The subway is not a domain of the
privileged and powerful. Rather, it is the primary means of transportation for literally millions of people of modest means, including hardworking men and women, students and elderly pensioners who live in
and around New York City and who are dependent on the subway for
the conduct of their daily affairs. They are the bulk of the subway's
patronage, and the City has an obvious interest in providing them with
a reasonably safe, propitious and benign means of public transportation. In determining the validity of the ban, we must be attentive lest a
rigid, mechanistic application of some legal doctrine gainsays the common good. In our estimation, the regulation at issue here is justified by
legitimate, indeed compelling, governmental interests. We think that
the district court's analysis reflects an exacerbated deference to the
alleged individual rights of beggars and panhandlers to the great detriment of the common good.'
55. Id.
56. Contra id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (quoting Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
57. Id. at 157.
58. See id. (applying O'Brien test).
59. See id. at 160 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
60. Id. at 158.
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In this passage, all the familiar motifs and imagery are present: the hardworking majority, the dangerous poor, the common good, the reasonable
authorities and the sensitive judge. Judge Altimari succeeds in completely denying the beggars' own sense of reality and depicting the
advantaged in society as being harshly treated by the recalcitrant poor.
Accordingly, the court is able not only to uphold the Transit Authority's
regulation, but also to do so in a way that does not rely upon a "mechanistic application of some legal doctrine."6 Instead, it makes a proud
appeal to the authoritative dictates of social justice and common
decency.
Although Judge Sand and Judge Meskill reached conclusions that
are more supportive of beggars, they still indulged in the patronizing
rhetoric of poverty. Judge Sand had no qualm with the idea that begging
was an expressive plea for charity: "While often disturbing and sometimes alarmingly graphic, begging is unmistakenly informative and persuasive speech." 6 2 In a short historical survey of begging, Judge Sand
acted preemptively in giving the lie to the Court of Appeals's efforts "to
suggest that begging has been universally viewed with the rancor and
enmity of, say, obscenity."6 3 Yet, the overall tone and effect of his judgment was to reinforce the rhetoric of poverty's core idea that the poor are
essentially different and potentially different: "A true test of one's commitment to constitutional principles is the extent to which recognition is
given to the rights of those in our midst who are the least affluent, least
powerful and least welcome."" While he demonstrated a genuine solicitude for the plight of beggars like Young and Walley, tipping the constitutional balance in their favor, he accepted the validity of the hardworking majority's interests in being relieved from the discomfort that
results from face-to-face confrontations with beggars. Also, he relied on
the same assumptions when he found that time, place and manner
restrictions that confine beggars to more marginal and less obvious vicinities were acceptable.
In his opinion, Judge Meskill comes closest to accepting the poor's
own account of reality. Rejecting the notion that charitable solicitation
can be meaningfully and genuinely distinguished from begging, he notes:
In the seclusion of a judge's chambers, it is tempting to assume that
beggars could obtain jobs and spend their free time distributing leaflets
or buttonholing passersby in the subway to further the cause of the
61.

Id.

62. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 352.
63. Id. at 353.
64. Id. at 360.
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homeless and poor. The record in this case, however, permits no such
speculation....

To suggest that these individuals, who are obviously

struggling to survive, are free to engage in First Amendment activity in
65
their spare time ignores the harsh reality of the life of the urban poor.

Nevertheless, like Judge Sand, Judge Meskill remains ensnared within
the privileged rhetoric of poverty. By recognizing that the interests that
the Transit Authority was advancing-such as the protection of the public from harassment, preservation of the quality of life, and maintenance
of a safe transit system-were legitimate and significant, he engages in
the dominant discourse in which there are the "hard-working New
Yorkers who rely on the subway system" and the belligerent beggar.
Furthermore, by distinguishing between "a homeless person politely
requesting money" and "the aggressive panhandler who accosts and
intimidates subway riders, ' 66 he reveals that beggars are only acceptable
on the advantaged's own terms and that beggars are not entitled to
express the genuine anger or resentment they may feel. Sadly, even the
most enlightened of the four judges held the view that form is more
important than substance; protocols of civility and politeness take priority over real suffering and distress.
III. BEGGAR YOUR NEIGHBOR
Even if the judges in Young, as "sympathetic" 6 7 as they claimed to
be, felt constrained by the judicial role from tackling the problem of
homelessness, academic commentators suffer from no such limitations.
As especially privileged members of society, legal scholars are cushioned
against risk and therefore must take full responsibility for their actions or
lack of them. Like the best kind of fools, they must go where others fear
to tread. Yet all that most of them can offer is compassion and rights.
For instance, in the case of the homeless, considerable scholarly energy is
devoted to establishing and defining a right to shelter.68 As the academic
analogue to many well-intentioned philanthropists, legal scholars
respond to social problems not with social solutions, but with the
bestowal of legal rights.
65. Young, 903 F.2d at 165-66 (Meskill, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 168.
67. See Young, 903 F.2d at 156-57.
68. See Patricia Siebert, Homeless People: Establishing Rights to Shelter, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 393
(1986); Note, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless in New York State, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1986).

216 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISCIPLINAR Y LAW JOURNAL
A.

INDETERMINATELY SPEAKING

In their daring rejoinder to Young, Helen Hershkoff and Adam
Cohen seek to alleviate the beggar's condition by arguing that begging is
fully protected speech under the First Amendment. 69 Their larger
concern is to engage political attention and, by making "it impossible for
[mainstream listeners] to be oblivious to the poverty in their midst,"7 0
place its eradication firmly on the agenda of social reform. Although
their general ambition is eminently laudable and worth struggling for,
Hershkoff and Cohen's reliance on rights-talk as a means to that end is
ultimately self-defeating. The dubious achievement of constitutional recognition for beggars' rights will likely increase, not reduce, the possibility
that "the poor are spoken of with the kind of dehumanizing imagery that
makes it possible for some to deny their existence and to expiate society
from any sense of responsibility.""v Indeed, Hershkoff and Cohen beg
the very questions that they seek to answer: why are there beggars and
how might we abolish them, expiate society from any real commitment
to change, and not institutionalize beggars?
Accordingly, in this section of the essay, I intend to explain the
seductive, but flawed and dangerous rhetoric of rights-talk to which
Hershkoff and Cohen fall victim. I also will caution against its wholehearted adoption by those committed to affecting social justice for the
dispossessed. While I recognize the strategic value of rights-talk, I urge
the abandonment of rights rhetoric as a categoric framework for understanding and remedying social injustice. Apart from its debilitating indeterminacy, the language of rights portrays and shapes a world that is
inimical to the long-term aspirations of all its citizens, especially les misdrables. Giving individual rights only responds to the stark symptoms of
poverty and may falsely obviate the need to confront the real structural
causes of this endemic social disease. Rights-talk's abstract, universal
and decontextualized depiction of individuals as moral beings undercuts
the have-nots' claims to be treated as fully human, and hinders efforts to
establish a more egalitarian and empowering vision of citizenship and
civic justice.
The appeal and limits of rights-talk flow from the same sources. At
the same time that it offers the prospect of empowering individuals and
69. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 18.
70. See id. at 912.
71. Id. at 915.
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rescuing them from collective tyranny, rights-talk also stifles the possibility of truly progressive social change. It treats people as abstract individuals rather than as situated citizens whose lives are presently constrained
as well as potentially satisfiable within existing socio-economic structures
and relational contexts. Like all ways of seeing and comprehending the
world, rights-talk distorts as much as it illuminates; it tends to shape the
world in its own political image. Within a capitalist democracy, the use
of rights-talk as a categoric mode of political argumentation suffers from
two debilitating weaknesses.7 2 Although one is conceptual in nature and
the other is ideological, they are related and mutually reinforcing.
,Whereas the first weakness is the ineradicable indeterminacy of rightstalk, the second is the alienating individualistic vision of social life on
which it is premised.
Within the liberal vision of society, people are portrayed as rational
maximizers and self-interested consumers of utilities in the neutral conditions of a market economy. There is no available metewand to make
interpersonal comparisons of utility and thereby generate a plausible
account of the public good. While individuals seek to obtain the maximum freedom to pursue their own self-interest, their efforts to do so
require security from the subjective and selfish interference of others
engaged in the same project. The central contradiction and paradox is
that the more freedom with which individuals are allowed to pursue such
ends, the less security they have against the intrusion of others. In short,
individual freedom seems possible only through its collective limitation
and negation: my freedom can only be obtained by curbing your freedom
and your freedom can only be obtained by curbing mine. As an attempt
at mediation, the creation of a political state is posited to replace the
anarchic war of all against all with an ordered world. In order to resolve
the dilemma of order-and-security, the theory of rights is enlisted to prescribe the extent and manner in which certain freedoms can be limited in
order to maintain sufficient social stability and peace to allow greater
freedom in general.
For such a theory to become operative, rights-talk must be capable
of deriving concrete responses to particular situations from its abstract
statements of principle. The history of liberal political theory and legal
practice provides cogent evidence of its failure to achieve that measure of
72. It must be emphasized that this section deals only with rights-talk as a categoric mode of
analysis and does not speak to the vexing question of the value of using rights-talk in a strategic
manner. For a complete account of this critical rejection, see Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1477 (1984).
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operational efficacy.13 Between axiom and application, there always
exists in law the surreptitious exercise of power to convert general rights
into particular results. As such, there is no relief from the heavy burden
of choosing. Rights-talk is more effectively understood as a convenient
screen of institutional propriety behind which competing interests can be
accommodated and behind which the ideological choices required to
effect such an accommodation can be hidden. Rights-talk is one kind of
ideology, not an escape from one.
In at least five instances, rights-talk fails to provide the determinate
guidance necessary to resolve the self-defined dilemma of liberal society.
First, there is no non-political way of arriving at what particular group of
rights are to be recognized and enforced-are socio-economic or collective rights to be included? Second, there is no uncontroversial means of
determining the scope and nature of these selected rights. Does speech
include advertising, flag-burning or swearing? Third, there is no neutral
standpoint from which to identify who are to be the recipients of such
rights. Are corporations, animals or fetuses covered? Fourth, there is no
method internal to the theory of rights that can be used to adjudicate the
clash of competing rights. What is the relation between liberty and
equality? Fifth, the recognition that rights are fundamental, but not
absolute, gives rise to the difficulty of balancing the public interest
against individuals' claims. Can speech rights be exercised anywhere at
any time? In all cases, rights-talk fails to ensure the operational efficacy
that it promises. It also fails to be a safe methodological haven for advocates and judges in a dangerously ideological world.
In their crafted commentary, Hershkoff and Cohen give an effective
and cogent demonstration of rights-talk's disabling indeterminacy.
Through a dextrous and sophisticated use of normative argument and
legal doctrine, they show that "begging is speech that existing first
amendment values and case law protect," 4 and that it cannot be banned
or unduly restricted. Of course, Hershkoff and Cohen resist the temptation to insist that this is the one and only true reading of the Constitution
beyond the cavil of political expediency. Instead, they recognize the critical imperative to accept that there are other plausible and opposing
interpretations that could also meet the general criteria of doctrinal fit
73. See Andrew Petter & Allan C. Hutchinson, Rights in Conflict. The Dilemma of Charter
Legitimacy, 23 U. BRIT.COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1989); Allan C. Hutchinson & Andrew Petter, Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 278, 297 (1988)
[hereinafter Private Rights].
74. Hershkotf & Cohen, supra note 18, at 910.
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and normative justification. Rights are a part of politics, not a precondition or boundary to the legitimate realm of contested politics. As such,
Hershkoff and Cohen's argument is a compelling exercise in the progressive project of deviationist doctrinalism-the attempt to utilize routinized argumentation to transformative effect without falling into the trap
of mistaking the contingently revisable for the revealed truth.7" However, the fact that the courts have not yet been persuaded by a Hershkoff
and Cohen-like brief ought to tip them off to the precarious nature of
their undertaking. It should not only remind them of the conservative
judicial instinct to side with the established order of things, but also alert
them to the ideological orientation of rights-talk that makes it more amenable to some appropriations and manipulations than to others.
B. Do THE RIGHTS THING?
The second weakness of rights-talk flows from and reinforces the
first. The predictability of rights-talk and its general political presuppositions rest upon an impoverished and partial notion of social life. It provides the institutional "means to express a tolerant market morality."76
As a historical artifact, it has played a positive role in social struggle and
retains obvious strengths, such as the value of privacy, distrust of bureaucracy, and worth of rational justification." However, rights-talk overthrew the divine right of kings, clergy and aristocracy only to replace it
with the sovereignty of the abstract individual-God in more philosophical and less theological uniform. It depicts individuals as separate and
egoistic, striving for a liberty that is self-regarding and a sociability that
is hollow. As such, it provides an inherently false account of human
community both in its present practice and future possibilities.
Under a regime of rights-talk, society becomes little more than an
aggregate of self-interested individuals who band together to facilitate the
pursuit of their own uncoordinated and independent life projects, which
is nothing more than a relation of strategic convenience and opportunism
rather than mutual commitment and support. The very essence of individual identity is conceived of as an abstraction from its constituent connections. In this way, relations with other individuals are understood in
terms of limitations rather than as vital contexts within which people can
become fully human. Liberal rights-talk obliges individuals to view their
connection with others and their responsibility for others as a matter of
75. See ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15-22, 88-90 (1986).
76. EDWARD ANDREV, SHYLOCK'S RIGHTS: A GRAMMAR OF LOCKIAN CLAIMS 21 (1988).
77. See ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE (1987).
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detachment and voluntary choice. There is almost a wilful refusal to
recognize the extent to which people are socially situated, a failure to
grasp how people shape and are shaped by their structured relations with
others. The liberal account of self, adrift in society and often a stranger
to itself, fails to grasp the idea and practice of oppression as group-based.
In particular, liberal theory's insistence on positing individuals as
rational, self-interested and pre-social ethical beings who share little
more than an abstract humanity manages to treat everyone the same,
while claiming to celebrate the difference and dignity of each. It is as
though everyone is a potential beggar. Even for progressive critics such
as Hershkoff and Cohen, moral autonomy and democratic citizenship
amount to little more than being abandoned to one's own devices and
being put at the mercy of one's enabling or disabling social setting. In
this way, rights-talk fails to comprehend that coercion can come in many
different and subtle forms; oppression is neither exhausted by the power
of the purse nor limited to the authority of the state. Within capitalist
society, the category of the "abstract individual" becomes very classist in
substance and orientation: rights-talk provides itself with little scope
within which to recognize material deprivation and the resulting social
oppression as the socio-cultural norm. Rights-talk posits an almost libertarian vision of the morally autonomous being as one committed to
robust self-reliance and fierce competitiveness; the specter of the "hardworking citizen" is always in mind.
An important corollary of this informing vision of social well-being
is the understanding that it is possible for beggars to alleviate their own
suffering. Empowered by a suitable set of rights and fired with an earnest
sense of disciplined industry, this deliverance is achievable without the
rest of society having to change or sacrifice anything. Although peddled
as a practically viable and eminently desirable ambition, it is really a
highly objectionable and socially disingenuous vision of dystopian dimensions. Again, it places the burden on the already disadvantaged and
relieves the presently advantaged from doing much at all. Furthermore,
it perpetuates the pretense that the existing economic order is only a neutral backdrop against which bargaining, exchange and the accumulation
of private property occur, but which itself has little impact on the nature
and effects of such transactions. This, of course, is a canard. Detaching
form from substance, liberalism compresses life into constricting forms
and turns questions of power into a discourse of power. 78
78. See Judy Fudge, The Effects of Entrenching a Bill of Rights Upon PoliticalDiscourse, 17
INT'L J. Soc. L. 445 (1989).
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A central claim made by Hershkoff and Cohen in support of a right
to beg is that it can foster a sense of social solidarity and mutual responsibility that is essential for the establishment of a truly communal society:
"the beggar implicitly proposes the communitarian vision in which citizens have a responsibility for each other's survival." 7 9 As speech that
engages, begging "has the ability to create social bonds between speaker
and listener."80 While the recognition of the need for solidarity is crucial, Hershkoff and Cohen's proposal is the very negation of a truly egalitarian community. The relational engagement between beggar and
listener is based on the most egregious imbalance of power. It does not
cultivate a "bond of empathy,"8 but perpetuates a one-sided and hierarchical relation of dependence. It arises in a plea of supplication and is
consummated in an act of pity: "A squalid bargain: a human soul for a
'82
hunk of bread. Poverty offers and society accepts."
Rather than bridging the gulf in power between rich and poor,
efforts to legitimate beggars' rights pretend that the gap can be bridged
by the most impersonal and patronizing of charitable gestures. By granting formal status to the unfortunate beggar, Hershkoff and Cohen mistake the aristocratic affectation of noblesse oblige for the truly democratic
spirit of communal welfare. It allows the haves to salve their troubled
conscience by a conspicuous display of private charity to the have-nots.
It is surely a cruel conceit to suggest that in this way beggars serve an
important social function "in permitting others to discharge their religious obligation to give charity."8 3 To rhapsodize the beggar in such
terms is almost tantamount to asking victims of a vicious assault to feel
comforted by the fact they have acted splendidly by allowing psychopaths to gratify their anti-social behavior. Surely this is the worst form
of rationalization and one that does little credit to either victim or perpetrator; it is dehumanizing and demeaning. Moreover, in the mutually
supportive relationship that is supposed to comprise begging, Hershkoff
79. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 18, at 902.
80. Id. at 910.
81. Id. at 914.
82. HUGO, supra note 1, at 180.
83. Hershkoff& Cohen, supra note 18, at 900 n.18. They compound this difficulty by arguing
that "the beggar nonetheless feels himself at an advantage, because the more fortunate need him as
an object of charity." Id. (quoting MARK ZBOROWSKI & ELIZABETH HERZOG, LIFE IS WITH PEO-

PLE: THE CULTURE OF THE SHTETL 211-12 (1952)). This is surely a perverse inversion of the
moral hierarchy.
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and Cohen's fixing of moral and cultural stigma on the listener is perversely misascribed: "[t]he soul in darkness sins, but the real sinner is he
84
who caused the darkness."
Hugo would have had the measure of such intellectual charity and
naivete. In a hard-hitting scene, he demonstrates the sublimated anger
that beggars feel toward their benefactors. The vile Thenardier is masquerading as a pitiable Fabantou, a dramatic artist fallen on hard times.
In what turns into a fateful meeting, he is visited by the philanthropic
Monsieur Leblanc, who is none other than the elusive Jean Valjean.
Although Thenardier is a conniving and thoroughly bad lot, his thoughts
on the self-righteousness of the charitable rich are pertinently tart. He
understands full well that philanthropy is not what the dispossessed
want, but what they despise:
Oh, God, how I hate them! I'd like to strangle the lot of 'em, the rich,
the so-called charitable rich, living in clover and going to Mass, and
dishing out sops and pious sentiments. They think they're our lords
and masters and they come and patronize us and bring us their cast-off
clothes and a few scraps to eat. Bastards! That isn't what I want.
Money's what I want, and money's what they never give us. They say
we'll just spend it on drink, and that we're all sots and loafers. And
what about them? Where did they spring from for God's sake?
Thieves, that's what they were, otherwise they'd never have got rich.
I'd like to take the whole blasted works and stand it on its head. Perhaps everything would get smashed up, but at least it would mean that
everybody would be in the same boat and we'd be that much to the
good...ss
On the issue of begging, contemporary America finds its Monsieur
Leblanc in the scholarly guises of Helen Hershkoff and Adam Cohen. By
institutionalizing and legitimating the position of "beggar," Hershkoff
and Cohen do les misdrables the considerable disservice of entrenching
the fact of poverty rather than working to eradicate it. The most that
begging does is to provoke charity, often generous, but it in no way
changes the general situation that permits and often condones the poverty that begets the beggar. These destitute souls beg not for alms, but

for an end to their plight as helpless hostages to capitalist fortune. It is
public transformation they seek, not private charity.
Like most rights in the liberal vocabulary, the right to beg is formal
and not substantive. Admittedly, begging helps to counteract the view
84. HUGO, supra note 1,at 30.
85. Id. at 647-48.
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that "poverty in America is either non-existent or insignificant '" 6 and
"makes it impossible for [mainstream listeners] to be oblivious to the
poverty in their midst,""7 but it fails to generate any substantive response
by way of a corollary right or otherwise." As a kind of speech, it is fully
satisfied by permitting individuals to give voice to their complaints, but
without any obligation on listeners to make any substantive response to
those pleas. It depicts a just society as one in which the achievement of
moral autonomy can be affected without concern for serious economic
equality. Indeed, taking seriously the idea of a right to beg confirms that,
in contemporary society, property still remains the measure of all things.
Without property, beggars are barely people: they are almost nothing,
because they own almost nothing. Echoing the sentiments of the nineteenth century industrial elite, the vast majority continue to believe that
all human beings have a real existence only if they make money or help
to make it.8 9
It is crass to talk of a person's self-realization in circumstances in
which "she is destitute and needs help." 90 To speak in such terms is to
fall victim to the idealist temptation to treat freedom as a purely metaphysical state of mind; people can be free even in the most dire of material conditions, provided that they have the liberty to think and speak for
themselves. It is a pretense of the privileged to talk of agency in such
circumstances. This amounts to the violence of abstraction and is the
philosophical kissing-cousin of rights-talk in the dysfunctional family of
liberalism. 9 1 Such political theorizing commits a grievous form of intellectual harm that gives fraudulent legitimacy to the content and consequences of contemporary living.
86. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 18, at 898.
87. Id. at 912.
88. It is tempting to propose a litigation strategy that strives to establish something like a right
to private property. There are many interesting and suggestive proposals for such tactics. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). However, the response of the courts to such claims has been less
than encouraging. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Moreover, there are other more
viable and less risky avenues of struggle open to progressive lawyers.
89.

See FREDERICK ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND 311

(W.O.Henderson & W.H. Chaloner eds. & trans., 1958).
90. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 18, at 903.
91. DEREK SAYER, THE VIOLENCE OF ABSTRACTION (1987); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Even most liberal theorists concede that to talk of "moral agency" in
conditions of abject poverty is nonsensical.
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IV. THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA
Progressive and non-progressive critics have failed to show that the
performance of the courts in fulfilling their political responsibilities has
met the exacting standards of constitutional legitimacy and justice. It
cannot claim to be a purely objective exercise in legal justification, to
supply the necessary level of operational determinacy, or to result consistently in progressive contributions to political life. Indeed, as the institution of judicial review moves into its third century, evidence mounts
and supports a skeptical view of the courts' inherent incapacity to
enhance or reconstruct the democratic quality of the American polity.
Benignly misguided or more sinisterly intended, the performance of the
judges has been largely conservative. There is little evidence to support a
more optimistic prognosis.9" Yet, rather than dwell on these failings and
indulge in a cynical smugness, I believe that the time has come to be
more constructive. This can be achieved by concentrating on the political ambitions that unite the academic combatants rather than on the
intellectual affiliations that divide them. As Rome bums, it does little
credit to anyone to stand idly by and take comfort in pointing out that
the city's fire fighters are using oil in the mistaken belief that it is water.
Accordingly, progressive scholars must look for better and different
ways to empower disadvantaged groups and to improve litigation of constitutional rights. In criticizing the political wisdom of striving to establish a right to beg, I have suggested that the pressing issue is not whether
such a right can be doctrinally justified, but why such efforts are warranted and what practical effect the recognition of such a right will have
on the larger progressive struggle to replace the capitalist economy. In
this section of the essay, I want to propose a more compelling account of
moral self-realization and a more constructive route to political enlightenment, one that better appreciates and incorporates the politically-situated and socially-oriented relational character of democratic governance.
In effecting such a proposal, two steps must be taken. The first step
is to raise the critical consciousness of lawyers by disabusing them of
their ingrained habit of resorting to the courts as the transformative
forum of choice. They must become more sensitive to the debilitating
effect of the extended involvement of courts in civic life. Secondly, progressive lawyers must develop a posture of "strategic skepticism" toward
92.
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the efficacy of even limited use of litigation in the struggle for social justice. To direct the have-nots to the courts as a matter of course is, in a
pertinent manner of speaking, to throw good money after bad.

A.

SHADES OF BROWN

The key issues for those devoted to improving the lot of les misdrables are to determine what substantive changes will best achieve that
objective, how those measures can best be implemented, and which institutions can best carry out that agenda. The details and priorities of progressive politics must be the continuing subject of healthy debate and
respectful disagreement. There is no place for an enforced orthodoxy or
rigid conformity because "a just society is not a society that has adopted
just laws, once and for all, rather it is a society where the question of
justice remains constantly open." 93 While there must be a willingness to
utilize diverse strategies to effect progressive change and to resort to a
variety of institutional sites, such tactical calculations need to be sensitive
to the prevailing realities of social power and economic ordering. The
history of social struggle strongly suggests that the courts are not institutionally or ideologically congenial to such efforts. The prospect of significant social change through litigation is, as Judge Jackson aptly put it, "a
teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 9 4
The life of Linda Brown is emblematic of the courts' congenital
defects as an arena for social change. In 1950, she was a young girl in the
town of Topeka, Kansas attending a segregated elementary school for
black children. Her father, Reverend Oliver Brown, raised a constitutional challenge to the arrangement. On May 17, 1951, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision that declared state-enforced segregation
of public schools to be unconstitutional.9 5 Hailed as a momentous decision, it was and still is treated as having struck a definitive blow on behalf
of racial justice. Indeed, Thurgood Marshall, Brown's leading lawyer,
was convinced that as a result of the Court's decision, segregated schools
were a thing of the past, and that in under ten years, segregation in all its
forms would be eliminated from the nation.9 6 However, Linda Brown's
life changed little. In 1979, a full twenty-five years after Brown, she
joined a challenge against the same Topeka educational system claiming
that her children were prejudiced by the still racially segregated
93.
94.
95.
96.

Cornelius Castoriadis, Socialism and Autonomous Society, 43 TELOS 91, 104 (1980).
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941).
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
N.A.A.C.P. Sets Advanced Goals, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 16.
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schools.9 7 Ten years later, in December, 1989, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that Topeka had not taken sufficient steps to
ensure that black children did not receive education inferior to that of
white children. 98
The frustrating experience of Linda Brown stands in cruelly stark
and sadly ironic contrast to the almost euphoric reception that the Brown
decision still receives in elite legal and academic quarters. 99 The overwhelming orthodoxy is that adjudication has always been important to
society and amounts to a socially significant institution. The prevailing
belief seems to be that adjudication produces a clear and direct effect on
the litigants' personal situation and brings about the judicially contemplated and intended change in the litigants' future relations. Furthermore, adjudication does not affect only the litigants. Although there will
be some distortion, judicial decisions tend to have a ripple effect. Like a
stone dropped into water, adjudication creates waves on the social pond;
their intensity and impact lessen as they travel further from the local
epicenter of the dispute. In short, there is a quaint and simplistic instrumentalism at large.
The problem with this sanguine scenario is that there is very little
empirical support for such extravagant and imperialistic claims." ° Of
course, the task of confirming or confounding these instrumental
assumptions is fraught with difficulty. Not only is there a paucity of serious study and analysis, but the subject does not lend itself to facile
inquiry. Any judicial current injected into the social body must immediately contend with the buzzing grid of forces already at work in society.
The judicial current might combine with other forces and either be completely overwhelmed and neutralized, or be the institutional straw that
breaks the social camel's back. On the other hand, the judicial impulse
might be sufficiently strong and well-directed that it will act in such a
manner as to effect a discrete and lasting change in social behavior.
However, the seduction of blunt or hasty conclusions should be avoided.
Judicial decisions are neither always nor never an influential factor in
social change. In the most comprehensive and exhaustive survey of the
97. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979).
98. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. grantedandjudgment
vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1992), opinion reinstatedby, 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied (Jan. 28, 1993).

99. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 2 (1986) (Brown "took the nation into a
social revolution more profound than any other political institution has, or could have, begun.").
100. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 111, 139-40 (1985) (new
judicial appointments change direction of the Court).
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field, Gerald Rosenberg is firmly of the opinion that "courts can almost
never be effective producers of significant social change."' 10 1 At best, the
courts' impact is so subtle that it is difficult to isolate. As such, the onus
is upon the proponents of the conventional view to ground their instrumental assumptions.
Judicial victories are hard-won and do not convert easily into effective social change. Apart from their ideological leanings, the courts lack
the resources or instruments to orchestrate such wholesale transformations. Possessing control over neither purse nor sword, 10 2 the judicial
capacity is limited and is better suited to highlighting the discrepancy
between social action and social ideals than to taking affirmative steps to
close that gap. Being reactive, the judicial branch of our government is
better suited for blocking and delaying change. 1 3 Moreover, legal victories may misleadingly signal social success and con people like Thurgood
Marshall into believing that the end is in sight and almost in reach. Winning of the litigation battle is not always a reliable indicator of the ultimate victor in the broader social war. Judicial success can dissipate in
the face of larger unsympathetic social forces and judicial failure can be
turned to social advantage. De jure results do not always correlate with
de facto outcomes.
Like modern medicine, litigation tends to be pathological and piecemeal in nature; it treats individual symptoms rather than structural
causes. Despite some recent realignment, courts still view themselves as
best suited, by tradition and expertise, to deal with one-shot, discrete,
two-party disputes, capable of being remedied by a transfer of money.
However, rights litigation for social change challenges this paradigm as it
moves away from it. The problems that it addresses are much more
amorphous and public and the solutions that it seeks are much more
prospective and quasi-legislative. Remedial administration is a continuing affair and there is not a dispute between private individuals about
private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy."° To
adjust to such disputes, not only must the courts rethink the parameters
of their institutional competence, but they must effect a dramatic change
101. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 338 (1991).

102. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). But
see Gerald E. Frug, The JudicialPower of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978).

103.
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BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960) (recalling judicial hostility to economic regulation).
104. See Abram Chayes, The Role of The Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976).
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in their willingness to experiment with imaginative injunctive schemes of
relief. Even if the judicial spirit was willing, the institutional flesh is too
weak.
Notwithstanding this incipient shift in response and orientation, the
courts focus their therapeutic efforts on individual behavior. Litigation is
most effective where a "negative order" (i.e. one requiring somebody to
refrain from action) is sought against a non-bureaucratic entity in a discrete dispute that can be implemented by a simple administrative directive. However, if there is to be real, lasting and significant social change,
there must be a transformation of institutional structures and social practices. Yet, it is in these very circumstances-continuing disputes with a
large bureaucratic organization, public or private, that require compliance by front-line officials, such as the police or welfare officials-that
courts are most reluctant and impotent to effect change. Bureaucratic
intransigence and complexity often block court-enforced change.
Accordingly, the best that can be expected from judicial institutions is
that their effects on social behavior and attitudes will be "incremental,
gradualist, and moderate." 10 5 This predicament and prognosis is best
evidenced and supported by the subsequent history of Brown.
Contrary to the conventional view that Brown marks the legal beginning of the social end to the American system of apartheid, the popular
drive to overcome racism began before 1954. The impact of the Supreme
Court's decision is contestable and attenuated. Initially, little change
occurred in the Southern states, official compliance was sporadic, and
judicial decrees routinely were ignored.'0 6 Only when the other branches
of government, with the powers of purse and sword, became involved by
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was action taken. While one might
surmise that Brown acted as a catalyst for congressional or presidential
initiatives, there is little data to confirm such an assessment. Nor is there
any convincing empirical evidence that Brown was the spark that ignited
the black population in a blaze of racial revolution. While the Supreme
Court's decision may have had a significant effect on black civil rights
leaders, 10 7 ordinary black people remained not-so-blissfully ignorant of
their so-called liberation.
105. JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 233 (1978).
106. G. THEODORE MITAU, DECADE OF DECISION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 1954-1964, at 60-78 (1967).
107. See ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 3 (1968).
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Paradoxically, Brown may have actually hardened resistance and
delayed change, although this conservative backlash might itself have
mobilized deeper forces of change. The legal obligation of government to
dismantle institutional racism made no significant contribution to
parents' decisions to avoid school desegregation; it had more to do with
the size of black enrollment and the parental capacity to finance private
education. 108 It might well be the case that Brown reflected, but did not
create, a momentum for change, and that only "when political, social
and economic conditions have become supportive of change, courts can
effectively produce significant social reform." 10 9
B.

CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Those committed to serious social change must not forget that what
is important is not the effect of a particular piece of constitutional litigation, but the very existence of the whole adjudicative process as a privileged mode of social action. In short, constitutional litigation and
adjudication are special social activities that do not so much cause or
change, but comprise and are constitutive of extant social conditions:
"[It] is not so much that the court is the natural expression of popular
justice, but rather that its historical function is to ensnare it, to control it
and to strangle it, by re-inscribing it within institutions which are typical
of a state apparatus." 1 0 To participate in the litigation process as lawyer
or litigant, however radical the claim or cause, is to challenge existing
social relations: Litigation may reinforce or alter the status quo. As a
result, constitutional litigation and adjudication may hinder rather than
enhance social change and entrench rather than overthrow the dominion
of the established order.
As such, it is dangerously naive and overly romantic to contend that
court-enforced rights can, will, or should be the preferred medium for
the social activist. The self-serving conceit of lawyers causes them to
encourage the continued use of litigation as a constructive and viable
route to social justice. As a purely pragmatic matter, history has little
encouraging to say. The language of the law often has been and continues to be the language of the poor's misery. While, as a practical and
instrumental matter, it is difficult to challenge subordination within and
through the very institutions that subordinate people, there is also the
108. See Michael W. Giles & Douglas S.Gatlin, Mass-level Compliance with Public Policy: The
Case of School Desegregation,42 J. POL. 722 (1980).
109. ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 31.
110. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POwER/KNOWLEDGE 1 (Colin Gordon ed. & trans., 1980).
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political and ideological grip that judicial discourse places on its participants. As I have tried to demonstrate in deconstructing the rhetoric of
poverty, the law presents and posits a reality that is partial in its values
and meanings: "[T]he legal forms we use set limits on what we can imagine as practical outcomes." ' 1
Throughout Les Misirables, law is one of the powerful and dark
forces that holds in place the social conditions that amount to a living
hell for many. In the enormous struggle between good and evil, law
stands as the manifestation and might of the established order. The personnel of the law are reviled, not revered. Indeed, Marius turns away
from his chosen career of advocate because "[t]he thought of consorting
with attorneys, hanging about the courts, chasing after briefs, was odious
to him." ' 2 For Hugo, the court is a place to be avoided and lawyers are
people to be chastised:
The sight of these groups of black-robed gentlemen murmuring
together on the threshold of a court of law is always a chilling one.
Little charity or compassion emerges from their talk, which is principally concerned with guessing which way the verdict will go. They are
like clusters of buzzing
insects absorbed in the construction of dark
1 13
edifices of their own.
This general sentiment of ill-will to law and lawyers festers throughout the novel, but erupts and is given full vent in several crucial incidents. By way of setting the theme and tone of the book, Hugo begins
with the cruel tale of Jean Valjean's imprisonment. At 24, orphaned,
impoverished and supporting his widowed sister's family of seven, he is
found guilty of stealing a loaf of bread and sentenced to five years of hard
labor. Valjean's fate is used to epitomize the terrible cruelty of the law
which "decrees the wrecking of a human life.., and consigns a sentient
being to irrevocable abandonment." '1 14 Like Jean Valjean, Young and
Walley were ground between the millstones of social neglect and legal
attention: their crime was more society's than their own. While their
punishment was less ferocious and outrageous than Jean Valijean's,
Young and Walley are entitled to be equally outraged at the imbalance
between the wrong allegedly done by them and the wrong inflicted upon
them by the law. For all three, law is the object of their outrage and a
cause of their misery. Society had concerned itself with them only to
castigate them further. To the pain caused by the indifference of social
111.
112.
113.
114.

Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 111 (1984).
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Id. at 240.
Id. at 93.
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conscience was added the indignity brought about by the solemnity of
legal sanction:
Was he the only one at fault in this fateful business? Was it not a
serious matter that a man willing to work should have been without
work and without food? . . . Was not the law more at fault in the
penalty it inflicted than he had been in the crime that he committed?
Had not the scales of justice been over-weighted on the side of expiation? And did not this weighting of the scales, far from effacing the
crime, produce a quite different result, namely, a reversal of the situation, substituting for the original crime the crime of oppression, making the criminal a victim and the law his debtor, transferring justice to
the side of him who had offended against it?... Was it not monstrous
that society should treat in this fashion precisely those least favored in
the distribution of wealth, which
is a matter of chance, and therefore
1 15
those most needing indulgence?
Nevertheless, while it is crucial not to exaggerate the contributions
of the court, it is equally important not to overstate the democratic qualities of representative institutions or to deny entirely the possibility that
legal forums could contribute to transformative struggle. Lawyers are
not always and only "the goon squad of the ruling class."'1' 16 As the pervasive conversational idiom of modem society, it is difficult not to participate in the stylized conversation of rights-talk in any attempt to
challenge existing arrangements and to improve the lot of ordinary people. But to join that conversation imposes a great risk of being co-opted
and becoming vulnerable to takeover. Nevertheless, the fear of co-option
must not lead to paralysis. It is neither impossible nor imprudent to
adopt the use of traditional rights litigation as a limited strategy in the
radical practice of law: the categoric denial of rights-talk is almost as bad
as its categorical embrace. Between addiction and abstinence lies the
considerable expanse of mindful moderation.
In efforts to transform law and society, a sensitivity to the contingent possibilities of any particular moment in social history is important.
A close attention to contextual detail is vital. In particular historical
conditions and social circumstances, rights-talk might not be entirely
without utility. However, its use must be informed, guarded and clearheaded; there is no room for romantic attachment. It must be used with
a caution that comes with the realization that it can as easily harm as do
115. Id. at 96-97.
116. David A. Price, Taking Rights Cynically: A Review of CriticalLegal Studies, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 271, 272 (1989); see also Patrick Macklem, Of Texts and DemocraticNarratives,41 U.
TORoNTO L.J. 114 (1991).
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the bidding of its user. Some of the right questions to ask about rights
are posed by Elizabeth Schneider:
Does the use of legal struggle generally and rights discourse in particu-

lar help build a social movement? Does articulating a right advance
political organizing and assist in political education? Can a right be
articulated in a way that is consistent with the politics of an issue or
that helps redefine it? Does the transformation of political insight into
legal argumentation capture the political visions that underlie the
movement? Does the use of rights keep us in touch with or divert us
from consideration of and struggle around the hard questions of political choice and strategy?117
The pivotal difficulty with rights litigation is that it is based on the
mistaken premise that the state is the major threat to citizens' freedom
and the single source of institutional oppression. Of course, the state has
an almost unparalleled potential for oppression and has often used it to
disreputable ends. However, to concentrate exclusively on the state fails
to recognize the extent to which private centers of power exert at least as
great an effect on the quality of people's lives as any function of official
authority: the state may be the only friend of the disadvantaged. Such a
state-citizen focus distorts the multiple and diffuse abuses of power that
constitute the social experience of domination. This ideological underpinning of rights-talk becomes particularly significant and stultifying
when it is combined with the fact that the thrust of litigation is the individualized attribution and remodification of fault: there is little attention
to the structural composition of injustice and the institutional limitations
of judicial remedies.' 1i
Ultimately, any gain through litigation will serve to lend popular
credence to the legal system as a legitimate arena for successful transformative activism. To engender respect for any rights gained and to
ensure their effective enforcement, it will be necessary to instill a general
reverence for the courts as a whole. 1 9 While such a strategy might allow
small advances to be made, it will actually defer and inhibit the kind of
profound changes necessary for truly progressive transformation: minor
improvements are the obstacles, not the precursors to major innovation.
117. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The DialecticofRights andPolitics"Perspectivesfrom the Women's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 622-23 (1986).
118. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOcIETY (1988); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing RacialDiscrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
119. See Harry J. Glasbeek, Some Strategiesfor an Unlikely Task- The Progressive Use ofLaw,
21 OTTAWA L. REV. 387, 396 (1989). For an illustration of this point in the context of Roe, see
infra part IV.C.
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For instance, when talking of small skirmishes and minor revolts, Hugo
contrasts this to large-scale insurrections. He suggests that, while such
acts may inspire "those it lays hold of with extraordinary and mysterious
powers, raising everyman to the level of events,"120 such restrained
uprisings may serve best the interests of those in power:
[I]n principle any revolt strengthens the government it fails to overthrow. It tests the reliability of the army, unites the bourgeoisie, flexes
the muscles of the police, and demonstrates the strength of the social
framework. It is an exercise, almost a course of treatment.
Power
121
feels revived after a revolt, like a man after a massage.
Moreover, small victories carry their own considerable price tag.
Being abstract and potentially universalistic, rights-talk has no necessary
political content and application: rights-talk is a site for struggle and
occupation, not a completed project. Consequently, any right that is
achieved cannot be controlled in its precise definition or utilization. It
can be ambushed and held hostage by non-progressive lawyers and
turned to the advantage of their own (privileged) clientele. Indeed, this is
exactly what has happened in Canada. In the first three years after the
introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms's equality provision,
there were approximately 600 court decisions of which forty-four decisions, or seven percent, involved sexual equality.' 2 2 Most alarmingly,
only seven of these cases were initiated by or on behalf of23women; the
1
other thirty-seven decisions were based on claims by men.
Mindful, therefore, that established interests have greater access to
courts and greater normative rapport with judges, one must realize that
the likelihood of systemic defeat being snatched from the jaws of a rights
victory is not small. The corporate takeover of the First Amendment is a
stunning example in point. 12 4 As Young itself clearly shows, not only
have corporations been able to reap considerable substantive protection,
they have also managed to manipulate the rhetorical agenda so that their
120.
121.

HUGO, supra note 1, at 884.
Id.
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123. BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 122, at 23.
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interests receive primary doctrinal consideration. The courts act cautiously when corporate concerns are implicated and, even when dealing
with non-corporate issues, they succeed in underlining the centrality of
corporate speech to the First Amendment paradigm. How else is it possible to understand a judicial mindset that fails to see the conceptual connection between corporate advertising and charitable solicitations such
that the former receives constitutional protection and the latter does
not?12 5 Clearly, rights-talk is the kind of constitutional conversation to
be avoided by the progressive activist.
C.

STRATEGIC SKEPTICISM

Imbued with an appropriate sense of critical consciousness, the most
encouraging course for progressive lawyers to follow is to develop a selfconscious program of strategic skepticism. Such a program would be
more the cultivation of a particular mindset and the refinement of various tactical techniques than the establishment of a manifesto of litigable
claims. The core idea is to act in a guerilla-like way, within a broad set of
progressive objectives, to seize the possibilities of any contingent moment
in order to achieve judicial decisions that heighten the status quo's contradictions and open up space for lasting political action. It is imperative
in pursuing such legal tactics that lawyers do not become intoxicated by
the spirit of their own rhetorical excesses. To take the reasoning of
judges seriously is to validate once again the very institution that is to be
subverted: it is to fall victim to the contagion of traditional jurisprudence
in which law thrives as a rational enterprise of abstract politics. The
progressive lawyer must forsake such comforting platitudes and remember that "the best we can do, as lawyers, is to raise consciousness about
the way law and its functionaries have helped create a hegemony which
the inequality in our polity makes look natural."12' 6
The situation that best exemplifies the benefits and risks of "strategic
skepticism" is the abortion litigation. The victory in Roe v. Wade 27
brought bright rays of progressive sunshine into the long and drab wintry
days of constitutional litigation. Yet it is vital not to forget what it is that
is being celebrated and why it occurred. Eugene Rostow and Alexander
125.
126.
127.

See supra part II.B.
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Bickel may have been right in casting the Supreme Court as an educational institution.12 However, while it is undoubtedly true that the
Supreme Court's decision offered a public occasion for civic instruction,
the best democratic lessons are invariably overlooked or ignored.
Indeed, Roe and its aftermath might well be viewed as a national seminar
in the efficacy of constitutional litigation and judicial review as forms of
political activism. As perennial members of les misdrables, the suffering
of men pales before "the abjection of women." 12 9 Some of the lessons to
be learned include the questionable instrumentality of judicial decisions
in social change, the continuing capacity of judges for vacillation, the
inhospitability of rights-talk to progressive claims, the need for disruptive
litigation tactics, and the dangers of litigation success.
As a matter of public discussion, abortion is constantly thought
about but never thought out. The debate is as old as society itself and
promises to continue for generations to come. In recent decades, the
engagement has shifted to the courts. Rather than bring clarity, order,
and restraint to this perennially contested topic, law has tended to exacerbate the tensions and differences among the protagonists. Indeed, the
debate over the legality of and permissible limits on abortion is a classic
example of legal argument: everybody talks, but few listen; everybody
has an opinion, but few agree; much is said, but little is accomplished.
Despite the contributions of numerous scholars and lawmakers, 13 the
issue remains unresolved, and is likely to be unresolvable to everyone's
satisfaction. However, the more limited focus of my attention is on the
extent to which the courts proved to be a beneficial forum for progressive
social change.
The first thing to be noted is that Roe was neither the victory that
pro-choice supporters wanted it to be nor the defeat that the anti-abortionists feared it would be. The decision of the Supreme Court was no
more (and no less) than another move in the play of social policy.
Indeed, available statistics and more informed opinions show that the
Supreme Court simply followed and approved changes that had already
128. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Characterof JudicialReview, 66 HARV. L. REV.
193, 208 (1952); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (1986).
129. HUGO,supra note 1, at 638.
130. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990); GILBERT
Y. STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY POLICY 51 (1981); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW

93-94 (1987).
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occurred.'
In the six years prior to the Supreme Court's decision, there
was a much greater increase in the number of abortions than after the
decision: the rise in abortions after 1973 merely continued an existing
trend. 132 As such, Roe allowed the social forces in play to continue in
effect; it did not start or accelerate the trend.' 33 The greatest impact has
not been on the number of abortions, but, rather, on the number of illegal
abortions that are performed. The Supreme Court's decision brought
abortion out of the criminal shadows and into the public light of day.
Nevertheless, while this result is to be applauded, the decision in Roe did
little to reduce continuing local obstacles to abortion. Women who had
difficulty in obtaining abortions before 1973 still experienced the same
difficulties after 1973.134
Indeed, Roe may well have coalesced and galvanized opposition to
abortion by providing a convenient focus for anti-abortion groups and
conservative forces. Contrary to some progressive hopes, the case may
not have exercised moral leadership on an equivocating nation. A flurry
of legislative proposals were made at the federal and state levels. For
instance, within three years of Roe, thirty-two states had passed legislation which sought to restrict or regulate access to abortions. 13 In the
twenty years since Roe, courts have been backsliding on their commitment to women's rights to reproductive freedom. While the Supreme
Court has not overruled Roe, it has allowed both the denial of Medicaid
funding for abortion services, 136 and the required provision of anti-abortion counseling.' 37 This speaks to deeper problems with a reliance on
rights-talk.
Apart from its debilitating indeterminacy, the abstract, decontextualized, and universal language of rights portrays and shapes a world that
131. See Julie Conger, Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution and its Impact, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 311
(1973); Thomas G. Moyers, Abortion Laws: A Study in Social Change, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 237
(1970).
132. See Edward Weinstock et al., Abortion Need andServices in the United States, 1974-1975, 8
FAM. PLAN. PEaRSP. 58, 58 (1976); ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 178-201.

133. Even a committed instrumentalist like Choper admits that the Supreme Court might have
been riding a tide of established social change. He contents himself with the conclusion that, at least,
the Roe decision "greatly hastened the drive toward abortion legalization." Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1, 189 (1984).
134. See Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19
FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 63 (1987).
135. See Joseph P. Witherspoon, The New Pro-LifeLegislation: Patternsand Recommendations,
7 ST. MARY'S L. J. 637, 646 (1976).
136. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
137. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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is inimical to the long-term aspirations of women to be treated as fully
human. Moral autonomy amounts to little more than being abandoned
to one's own devices and being put at the mercy of one's enabling or
disabling social setting. This sense of non-attachment "is not the way
women generally think about themselves and is utterly inappropriate as a
description of a woman who is pregnant." 13 Within liberal society, the
category of the "abstract individual" becomes very patriarchal in substance and orientation: rights-talk provides itself with little scope within
which to recognize women as members of oppressed groups, or male
hegemony as the socio-cultural norm. Not only does liberalism posit a
male vision of the morally autonomous being as one committed to robust
self-reliance and fierce competitiveness, it manages to assume that reproduction and child-rearing will take care of themselves. As such, liberal
theory offers women a Hobson's choice: they must deny that an important part of their moral and social distinctiveness derives from their
reproductive capacities if they are to obtain full moral standing, or they
must reduce themselves entirely to their reproductive identities and
become dependent second-class citizens, trapped within the confines of
1 39
their own biological distinctiveness.
Another feature of a Roe-like right is its negative aspect. In contrast
to Brown, any instrumental success of Roe may have been because the
complainants' requested remedy was more suited to the courts' traditional self-image; they asked for state withdrawal and not state interference. However, the very arguments that are used to ground and police
the woman's right to choose an abortion handcuff its proponents' and the
courts' ability to develop and substantiate that right. There are very definite and conservative limits to rights that are based on a "keep the state
out" philosophy of moral action and choice. Freedom is more than a
138. Donna Greschner, Abortion and Democracyfor Women: A Critique ofTremblay v. Daigle,
35 MCGILL L.J. 633, 652 (1990); see also Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 (1988).
139. Similarly, an acknowledgement of social realities undercuts many of the abortion opponents' arguments. They claim to root their convictions in respect for the sanctity of human life, but
the life that they seek to protect would seem to begin at conception and end at birth. This narrow
vision inexcusably ignores the fact that denial or access to safe abortion services will put the lives of
countless women in jeopardy. Prohibiting or restricting reproductive choice, while adequate day
care and social support services continue to be denied to women, will not eradicate the need or desire
for abortion. Rather, it will compel beleaguered and poor women to once again risk septicemia and
death at the hands of unscrupulous back-street butchers. A return to those dark ages would be a sad
legacy. See Lisa Fishbayn & Allan C. Hutchinson, Slouching Toward Gilead: Rights-Talk and
Abortion (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Southern CaliforniaInterdisciplinaryLaw
Journal).
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lack of collective interference; it is the establishment of positive opportunities for substantive action. A more positive and less rights-oriented
vision of social justice would not be premised on liberty as negatively
defined, but would look to the state to stand by and empower women so
that they would have the true autonomy to make decisions for themselves, have those decisions respected, and work toward providing the
social conditions and institutional resources to give effect to those decisions. In short, the more pressing challenge is to establish a social life in
which the need to choose abortion would be greatly reduced-a world in
which women could be equally and fully human."
The negativity of rights-talk results from the liberal insistence on
dividing the world into public and private spheres. 14 1 The courts are
constrained to view the state as a potential source of oppression and to
treat the private realm as a sphere of freedom. While the state can be a
culprit, victims often suffer oppression at the hands of private actors and
through structures of private power. On questions of abortion, the
courts still cling to a strict and inappropriate division of social life in the
public and private realms. As the Supreme Court so succinctly expressed
in Harris,"although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not
of its own creation."' 4 2 Such platitudes only add insult to injury.
Women can only get an abortion if they can find a doctor to do it and
have the financial resources or funding assistance to pay. Without adequate resources or funding, abortion remains accessible only to the privileged. In such circumstances, a putative right to an abortion is cold
comfort. Again, those who comprise les misdrables do so because of personal failings and not through any systemic fault with the polity. As
Rhonda Copelon summarizes it:
To treat a woman's poverty and her inability to exercise choice as a
consequence not of public policy but of private fault is an erroneous
and dangerous fiction built upon the traditional separation of the public and private spheres. It rests on the idea, central to capitalist patriarchy, that the family unit has the responsibility of being economically
self-sufficient. Not only does privatization permit the state to escape
responsibility for the tragic conditions of people's lives. The ideology
140.
Abortion,
141.
142.

See Brenda Cossman, The Precarious Unity of Feminist Theory and Practice: The Praxisof
44 U. TORONTo FAC. L. REV. 85, 107 (1986).
See Hutchinson & Petter, Private Rights, supra note 73.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.

[Vol. 2:199 1993]

LES MISERABLES REDUX

of private responsibility also makes it possible to blame the poor, who
43
are overwhelmingly women, for their inability to be self-sufficient.1
A progressive vision has a different understanding of social life and
its possibilities for justice. It would accommodate the fact that women
are different than men in their reproductive characteristics, understand
the socio-political relations that frame and valorize those facts, and
ensure that any understanding of what it is to be a full moral being incorporates the vital material dimension of women's lives. 14 4 Recognition
that subordination is reinforced by ignoring the relevance of social conditions that give rise to that subordination in the first place is essential.
Consequently, a non-liberal theory of public responsibility begins with
the inseparable connection between social conditions and the individual
exercise and experience of personal autonomy. So instructed, it looks
beyond the negative legalisms of rights-talk to the affirmative politics of a
needs-oriented social agenda. As a practice of communal solidarity, it
concerns itself as much with social welfare as it does individual privacy.
Of course, the fact is that les misirables are not accorded the privilege of choosing the institutional site or rhetorical conditions of their
struggle for social transformation. Nevertheless, this is neither as significant nor as debilitating as might first be thought. The first step to
enlightenment is the recognition that there is no available "outside" from
which to engage in transformative action: all struggle is already situated
within the mechanisms that are to be resisted and reworked. Struggle
must commence from where we are and with the historical problems and
possibilities of the present. The only available strategy is to develop legal
tactics that politicize and disrupt the courts in the process of using them
for litigation. 4 ' The challenge is to engage in law and, at the same time,
to delegitimize it by eschewing abstract notions of justice and rights in
favor of concrete challenges.
The worst implication to be drawn by lawyers from the abortion
decisions would be to believe that, by making the correct arguments and
143. Rhonda Copelon, UnpackingPatriarchy:Reproduction,Sexuality, Originalism,and Constitutional Change,a Less Than Perfect Union, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION 303, 323 (Jules Lobel
ed., 1988).
144. See ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (1984); ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL
EQUALITY (1984).

145. For a power-oriented rather than right-centered approach to law practice, see Peter Gabel
& Paul Harris, Building Power and BreakingImages: CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law,
11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983); see also Carol Smart, Feminism and Law: Some
Problems of Analysis and Strategy, 14 INT'L J. Soc. L. 109 (1986).
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by following the same doctrinal logic, it will be possible to consolidate
gains made or achieve further successes. To do this would be to take too
seriously the transformative power of abstract reasoning and to endow
the legal process with a spurious legitimacy. It remains true that, in a
political culture which grants an increasingly significant place to litigation and in which rights-talk possesses a special resonance, claims
phrased in the rhetoric of rights might be less easily rejected and might
act as a catalyst for the mobilization of popular struggle. As such, it
might be feasible and successful on occasion to point out the frequency
with which contemporary society fails to live up to its own expectations.
Nevertheless, in general, it will only be by maintaining a thoroughgoing
skepticism of such talismanic tendencies and by recognizing the strategic
significance of such litigation in particular socio-economic circumstances
that the viability of any resorts by progressive lawyers to the courts can
146
be sustained.
The greatest danger of a rights litigation strategy is that it might
succeed occasionally, but often enough to warrant continued faith in its
efficacy as the chosen venue for progressive struggle. The attempt to
make a silk purse of social justice out of the pig's ear of constitutional
jurisprudence becomes too easily a waste of radical zeal. With any
apparent success, it is vital not to forget that adjudicative success (or
failure) only marks the end of one phase of struggle and the beginning of
another. It is not a triumph (or a defeat) unless the legal currency can be
converted into a negotiable instrument for real social change. Most
importantly, when a legal success is achieved, it must be remembered
what it is that is being celebrated-it is not the institution of the Supreme
Court or the process of constitutional adjudication. To fete the institution or the process is to pave the way for long-term disaster. For when
the institution or the process produces a decision that is hostile to progressive interests or overrules an earlier supportive decision, that decision
will be endowed with the imprimatur of political legitimacy. Ironically,
this will have been achieved because of, and not in spite of, the activists'
efforts.
What ought to be celebrated is the substance of the decision itself
and its potential concrete effects. Another bench on another day might
146. The record of the civil rights movements offers evidence of the limited successes (and substantial dangers) of obliging the political and legal establishment to honor its own half-hearted commitment to the universal dimension of rights talk. See Richard Delgado, The EtherealScholar: Does
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987);
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
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use the cover of the Bill of Rights to smite, not protect, the same interests.147 It is crucial to acknowledge that success was not due to lawyers
or constitutional charters, but to the political force of committed women
coming together and working together. It was a triumph of popular will
that made it possible for the Supreme Court to decide as it did in Roe.
Whether Roe is eviscerated or invigorated will also be decided by the
ideological dynamics of public action and most definitely not by the
imminent rationality of constitutional law. That a majority of judges had
the foresight and the courage in 1973 to heed the democratic call for
gender justice is a cause for jubilation. But Roe ought not be a rallyingcall for constitutional enchantment: one swallow does not a progressive
summer make.
As well as perpetuating the idea that justice comes from a judicial
act of noblesse oblige rather than a product forged at the anvil of social
struggle, a dependence on litigation struggles over rights will dissipate
much valuable energy that could be better used elsewhere. Direct citizen
involvement is always to be preferred to constitutional litigation. At the
heart of any progressive campaign for social justice, there must be a firm
commitment to the development of popular coalitions so that the disenfranchised can become part of their own empowerment. If a true democracy is to be the goal, it must be effected by means that are themselves
thoroughly democratic in nature. The shift from less of an individualcentered and rights-based approach to more of a group-based and poweroriented program will facilitate ambition. In this way, it might become
possible to "recognize and accommodate the political importance of process over legal goals and build links with communities whose perspectives" are not usually or easily represented in the practices of
14 8
constitutional litigation.
At best, the courts and, therefore, constitutional litigation, can never
be more than a surgical aid to an ailing political system. The more
appropriate progressive response is to treat the cause of the malaise
rather than its symptoms by working to democratize better the political
process. Continued resort to the courts to resolve political issues reinforces the undemocratic view that the political and representative forums
are inappropriate and ineffective; it will become an unfortunate self-fulfilling prophesy. The vast energies and resources of lawyers are better
deployed in legislative reform than in ingenious litigation: Lawyers are
the only real long-term beneficiaries of the present obsession with courts.
147. See Frances Olsen, Unravelling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1989).
148.
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It is perverse to liken judicial review to a dialogue or debate between
citizens and the State about the reasonableness of government action. 149
If there is any debate, it is between different branches of government:
Citizens' complaints only provide an occasion for a discussion in which
those citizens can listen hopefully and speak episodically in the highpriced words of an arcane legal vocabulary. Democracy demands that
citizens are more than eavesdroppers at the doors of power.
V.

CONCLUSION

In one of the great characterizations of literature, Hugo creates
Inspector Javert, the archetypical embodiment of law. He is the incarnation of unbending legalism and the symbol of righteous rectitude. With a
"vulture gaze" 150 and leading "a life of unswerving duty,"'5 1 he was "a
man with a profound instinct for correctitude, regularity, and probity,
and with a consuming hatred for the vagabond order to which he himself
belonged."' 5 2 In short, "law and order, morality, government, the whole
of society, were personified in [him]." 15 3 Like an indignant bloodhound,
he tracks Jean Valjean throughout his life. Their episodic encounters
represent the clash between the popular pressures for social change and
the established forces of authoritarian order. But, in the melodramatic
denouement to their titanic engagements, Javert is caught in the throes of
indecision. His life having been saved by Jean Valjean, he is confronted
by an irresolvable choice between the unfamiliar promptings of his conscience to let Jean Vajean go free and the life-long dictates of his social
duty to apprehend a convicted felon. Racked by the anguish of uncertainty and like "an owl required to see with eagle's eyes,"' 154 he was
forced to admit that "there may be error in dogma, that society is not
155
perfect ... that judges are men and even the law may do wrong.'
Tormented and contrite, he takes his own life.
Perhaps, like Javert, judges must retire from the social scene if justice is to prevail. Yet, even when faced with their own complicity in les
misirables' wretchedness, it is unlikely that courts and lawyers will effect
such a noble or final retreat. Chastised by critics for its rigidity, the law
149. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1978).
150.
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has learned to bend more and to cope better with contradiction. Formalism has proved to have unexpectedly durable and adaptable qualities.
Indeed, the rhetorical life of contemporary law may be the intense experience of its own contradictory logic. 5 6 Paradoxically, the best way to
push courts and litigators out of the social action is for political activists
and progressive lawyers to pull themselves away. Without constitutional
litigation to invigorate it, the judicial process might wither away as the
leading institutional organ for social policy-making. As a matter of contingent wisdom, it is a definite case of less being more.
Like everything else, the problem with poverty is that its abasements
become bearable to its wretched victims and that it is accepted as inevitable by those who perpetuate its condition. Although legal activists, like
Hershkoff and Cohen, might castigate the judges in Young and mainstream society for perpetuating a phantom normalcy in which the
problems of les misdrables are diminished and dismissed, they manage to
perpetuate that condition. By allowing beggars the constitutional privilege to "speak to the broader society about the pain of being poor," ' 7
they give formal recognition to the poor as natural residents of contemporary American society. This moves people to anguish, but not to
action. It is not formal status or rights that they crave or that we should
wish to bestow. Rights only work for those who are already privileged.
To others, they are a travesty of justice. It is change, not its promise,
that is needed. Neither patronizing nor romanticizing les misirables,the
ambition must be to embrace everyone with the arms of a society that
truly cares for the plight of all. To do otherwise is to run the risk of
turning on its head Anatole France's ironic lament for "the majestic
equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the
58
bridges, to beg in the streets, and steal bread."'
It is not enough to invite beggars to the bourgeois banquet so that
they can, at least once, experience the good life. This not only demeans
the guests and makes the hosts feel undeservedly beneficent, but it works
as an almost celebratory occasion for "the way things are." To paraphrase Marx, the beggar is not freed from the tyranny of private property, but receives the dubious freedom to beg for it.'5 9 Not only does a
right to beg not change the underlying structure of private property and
156. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay in Legal Interpretation,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541 (1989).
157. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 18, at 912.
158. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 91 (Winifred Stephens trans., 1970).
159. See Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, On the Jewish Question (1843), in 3 COLLECTED
WORKS 146, 164 (1975).
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its unequal distribution, but it places that very structure of capital
accumulation outside the activist agenda of transformative possibilities.
Any non-liberal vision of social justice must understand and be prepared
to alter fundamentally the structural conditions that entrench the misery
and humiliation that is the enduring lot of the pathetic panhandler. A
progressive campaign for moral self-realization and political enlightenment must address these deep sources of institutional injustice that frame
and valorize the lives of rich and poor alike.
It is a profound error to talk about poverty without also talking
about wealth. There should be no talk about food banks without talk
about investment banking; no talk about empty plates without talk about
food mountains; no talk about the working poor without talk about the
idle rich; and no talk about the homeless without talk about the property
speculator. If poverty has a moral or immoral dimension, it will not be
found in the habits and characteristics of the poor and homeless, but in
the routines and rationalizations of the rich and propertied. Moreover,
those who are presently privileged and committed to eradicating poverty
must not be content to speak for and on behalf of les misirables. They
must have a place of their own from which to speak and nurture a voice
of their own in which to speak. Beggars are only saved when they no
longer exist. Their salvation demands nothing less than that their suffering become ours too. And still we ask-"who is to blame?"' 60

160. HUGO, supra note 1, at 640.

